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Competing Orders? The Challenge of 
Religion to Modern Constitutionalism 
Ran Hirschl† and Ayelet Shachar†† 
Religion and constitutionalism often collide on both substantive values and 
policy preferences. Moving beyond the familiar angle of divergent value sets, this 
Essay critically highlights the structural, “clash of orders” features that make reli-
gion a credible rival and a serious challenger to modern constitutionalism. We iden-
tify three additional dimensions of the potential clash between religion and consti-
tutionalism in a world of resurgent populist nationalism: (1) the structural logic of 
competing orders; (2) the strategic reliance on religious identity markers to generate 
unequal civic standings among formally equal citizens; and (3) the transnational 
nature of religious solidarity and affiliation, which permits escape from, and may 
destabilize, the project of the territorially bounded constitutional state. Compara-
tive examples reveal how the confluence of these factors has played out in various 
settings—north and south, national and international—to present a serious threat 
to the constitutional domain. Taken together, the conjunction of these ideational and 
structural sources of friction positions religion as one of today’s main challenges to 
the constitutional order as a whole, but especially to its liberal iterations. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rule of law and the rule of God appear to be on a collision 
course. These two of the most powerful ideas of all time are an 
odd couple of sorts, diametrically opposed in many respects, yet 
at the same time sharing strikingly similar characteristics, each 
with its own sacred texts, interpretive practices, and communities 
of reference. The potential conflict between them is intensified by 
preliminary skirmishes at the intersection of two broad trends: 
the global reach of constitutionalism and religion’s return to the 
forefront of world politics. Consequently, the constitutional do-
main has become a main stage on which the return of religion and 
religiosity is played out. 
Much has been written about the global convergence on con-
stitutional supremacy and judicial review, perhaps even the 
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emergence of a global constitutional order, most visible in the con-
text of rights.1 At the same time, religion has taken the center 
stage of public debate worldwide, and it is frequently identified 
as the cause of large-scale global conflict and as a main source of 
transnational solidarities. 
From the surge in Christian fundamentalism to revivalist 
Islam to the spread of Catholicism and Pentecostalism in the 
Global South, and from the rise of Hindu and Buddhist national-
isms in Asia to heated debates about religion-infused morality, 
cultural heritage, and boundaries of membership in the Americas 
and in Europe, it is hard to overstate the significance of the reli-
gious revival in early twenty-first century politics. In contrast 
with the predictions of secularization theory, religion is back 
with a vengeance. 
Virtually every major religious tradition has produced its 
own forms of extremism and growing disregard for the rights of 
“others.”2 In an increasing number of countries, the alignment be-
tween religious identity and populist-nationalist politics seems 
stronger than ever. At the same time, religious communities have 
been thriving at the level of civil society, oftentimes offering forms 
of belonging that undercut territorial borders and forge transna-
tional allegiances. The constitutional domain has been a means 
for and the target of much of this religious revival. Consequently, 
religion’s challenge to constitutionalism has once again come to 
the fore. 
Religion and constitutionalism often collide on substantive 
values and policy preferences. Increasingly, these value conflicts 
manifest themselves through high-profile legal clashes and court 
cases in which the stakes for the competing parties and the social 
groups they represent are both high and visible. Protection of gen-
der equality, reproductive freedoms, LGBTQ rights, and the right 
to die with dignity are considered some of the hallmarks of the 
current liberal constitutional-rights jurisprudence. Not all reli-
gious circles resist this emerging canon, yet many of them do, and 
 
 1 See, for example, Colin J. Beck, et al, Constitutions in World Society: A New Meas-
ure of Human Rights *4–5 (unpublished manuscript, Feb 2, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6HMV-M2V8; Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights 1–5, 
15–16 (Oxford 2012); David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of 
Global Constitutionalism, 99 Cal L Rev 1163, 1171–73 (2011); David S. Law, Generic Con-
stitutional Law, 89 Minn L Rev 652, 687–94 (2005). 
 2 Religion may also be a catalyst for evoking justice and equality claims for political 
and legal reform; certain strands of the abolitionist movement and the civil rights move-
ment are examples of this pattern at work, which is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
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some quite vehemently. The stance of the traditional Catholic 
Church, conservative Evangelical movements, Wahhabist Islam, 
or ultraorthodox Judaism on these issues is well known: it is dia-
metrically opposed to the liberal constitutional view. In polities 
with a history of religion-infused law and morality, issues such as 
blasphemy, proselytism, inheritance, and personal status often 
collide with constitutional provisions regarding equality, freedom 
of expression, and freedom of religion. Religious sectors’ fierce re-
actions to landmark court rulings, such as the Obergefell v 
Hodges3 decision in the United States, the UK Supreme Court 
(UKSC) ruling in R(E) v Governing Body of JFS,4 the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) judgment in S.A.S. v France,5 
or most recently the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) ruling in 
Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV,6 are merely a few recent 
examples. 
The jurisprudential and scholarly writing on the ideational 
friction between religion and constitutional rights is abundant. 
So is the literature that proposes legal techniques to mitigate 
such tensions.7 In this Essay, however, we wish to move beyond 
the divergent value-sets angle. Instead, we aim to highlight a vi-
tal yet underappreciated dimension of the fraught relationship 
between constitutionalism and religion: the structural, “clash of 
orders” (not “clash of values”) features that make religion a cred-
ible competitor of and a serious challenger to modern constitu-
tionalism. Our focus is on the systemic aspect of religion, with its 
 
 3 135 S Ct 2584, 2602–05 (2015) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right guar-
anteed to all couples, including same-sex couples, by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 4 [2010] 2 AC 728, 745 at ¶¶ 10–12, 751–52 at ¶ 35 (UKSC) (subjecting admission crite-
ria in a North London Jewish day school to general administrative-law and constitutional-law 
provisions). 
 5 [2014] 3 ECtHR 341, 376–81 at ¶¶ 137–59 (holding that, in the context of France’s 
“burqa ban,” state autonomy and regulatory powers over attire in public spaces trump 
considerations of faith-based freedoms). In 2017, the ECtHR ruled that Belgium’s laws 
banning full-face covering did not breach the Convention, affirming the earlier S.A.S. de-
cision. See generally Dakir v Belgium, App No 4619/12 (ECtHR July 11, 2017); Belkacemi 
and Oussar v Belgium, App No 37798/13 (ECtHR July 11, 2017).  
 6 [2017] 3 CMLR 673, 707–09 at ¶¶ 32–44 (ECJ) (holding that, under certain condi-
tions, employers may dismiss employees who refuse to comply with company policies con-
cerning religious attire). 
 7 We ourselves have contributed to such attempts. See generally, for example, 
Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights 
(Cambridge 2001); Ayelet Shachar, Squaring the Circle of Multiculturalism: Religious 
Freedom and Gender Equality in Canada, 10 L & Ethics Hum Rts 31 (2016). For a com-
parative exploration of the relationship between law and religion in the nonliberal world, 
see generally Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard 2010). 
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own symbolic appeal and interpretive hierarchy, separate consti-
tutive narratives, different jurisdictional concepts and conflict 
resolution norms, cross-border affiliations, and transnational mo-
bilization capacity. Comparative examples reveal how the conflu-
ence of these factors has played itself out in various settings—
north and south, national and international—to present a serious 
threat to the constitutional domain. As the challenge posed by re-
ligion is a complex, multifaceted one, we limit our discussion to 
three main axes: (1) the “clash of orders” challenge; (2) the affin-
ity between (majoritarian) religion-based affiliations and populist 
variants of nationalism, and the threat they pose to more inclu-
sive definitions of “who belongs” within the domain of constitu-
tional democracy; and (3) the transnational nature of religious 
solidarity and affiliation, and the challenge it poses for the statist 
constitutionalist project. We address each in turn. 
I.  WHO REIGNS SUPREME? CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RELIGION 
AS TWO SOVEREIGN KINGDOMS 
Today’s iteration of the rivalry between throne and altar is 
one flare-up of an ongoing entanglement in a millennia-long 
struggle for power and authority. The canon of the Western tra-
dition is filled with references to these “two kingdoms” and their 
unstable relationship, political and theological. These include the 
distinction between the eternal city of God and temporal earthly 
city of man, the deliberation over how to “[r]ender to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s,” or 
the distinction between the sacred authority of the priests and the 
royal power.8 With a few exceptions, religion, law, and politics 
were closely intertwined, perhaps even unified throughout much 
of premodern history. The modern era eventually saw the emer-
gence of the doctrine of separation of church and state, advocated 
by Enlightenment thinkers as a means of confining religious pas-
sions, which they characterized as dangerous and irrational, to 
the nonpolitical realm. In this familiar narration of the advent of 
secularism, the public sphere was portrayed as the realm of rea-
son, whereas the private sphere began to be regarded as the realm 
of faith. In creating this characteristic (though never finalized) 
division between secular public space and religious private space, 
 
 8 Mark 12:17 (New American Standard Version); Matthew 22:21 (New American 
Standard Version); Luke 20:25 (New American Standard Version). 
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European secularism sought to hustle religious ritual and disci-
pline into a confined realm, devoid of direct political influence in 
the affairs of the modern state.9 Even a cursory look at the world 
around us reveals that this vision never fully materialized. In 
almost every country, religion plays a role, whether formal or in-
formal, in public life. This distinction, however reductionist and 
otherwise problematic, has nevertheless come to be identified as 
a legal and cultural marker of the sovereign and newly emerging 
secular state ideal. 
With the American and French revolutions of the late eight-
eenth century, absolute monarchies granting feudal privileges for 
the aristocracy and clergy underwent a radical change grounded 
in novel principles of constituent power, secularist nationalism, 
nondenominational citizenship, inalienable rights, and the strict 
separation of church and state. These foundational changes re-
flected new ways of organizing social life and claiming author-
ity—on the basis of popular sovereignty (“We the People”) rather 
than a divine order. With the rise of nationalism and modern 
state formation throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, the ideal of formal separation of religion and state—often 
established through a constitutional structure—became preva-
lent in the legal imagination.10 
In practice, however, the dichotomous view of separation is 
rather unrefined. In reality, several prototypical models exist, 
ranging from atheism or assertive forms of secularism to consti-
tutional enshrinement of religion as a state creed and as a main 
source of legislation. Even within the range of countries that ad-
here to the separationist model, considerable variance exists 
among secularism as a form of state “religion” (for example, 
France), state neutrality toward religion (for example, the United 
States), weak establishment (for example, Germany), and accom-
modation, or even celebration, of religious difference (for example, 
Canada). In other settings, the relationship between state and re-
ligion is even more complex, with constitutional provisions and 
 
 9 For a famous articulation, see Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and 
Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 27–29 (Johns Hopkins 1993). In practice, as 
philosopher Charles Taylor notes, secularism never completely banished religion. See 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 2 (Belknap 2007) (describing “vestigial” public references 
to religion in the public spaces of Western Europe). 
 10 For an overview, see John Witte Jr, Law and Religion in the Western Legal Tradi-
tion, in Silvio Ferrari, ed, Routledge Handbook of Law and Religion 29, 38–41 (Routledge 
2015). See also José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 40–41 (Chicago 1994) 
(describing the “privatized” role that religion performs in some constitutional regimes). 
430 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:425 
 
jurisprudence dealing with either a legacy of religion-infused mo-
rality (for example, Ireland), enclaves of religion-based jurisdic-
tional autonomy (for example, India), preferential treatment of a 
single state-endorsed religion alongside protection for religious 
minorities’ rights (for example, Israel, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka), 
or strong establishment of religion (for example, so-called Islamic 
constitutionalism, ranging from moderate versions in Morocco or 
Bangladesh to much more rigid ones in Iran or Saudi Arabia). 
Obviously, there is considerable variation within, let alone 
among, these prototypical, or ideal-type, models. Each comes in 
different shapes, forms, and sizes; local nuances and idiosyncra-
sies abound. This variance is often rooted in distinctive political 
legacies, differences in constitutional structures and aspirations, 
and dissimilarities in historical inheritances and formative expe-
riences, as well as significant differences in value systems and 
foundational national metanarratives. Such differences often feed 
and shape the specific ways in which the tension between religion 
and constitutional governance manifests itself. 
No less significant, unlike the conventional image of a clash 
of civilizations, there is actually a strong echo of religion in each 
and all of these models. All constitutions—every single one—
directly address the issue of religion head on.11 Some constitutions 
despise it, others embrace or even defer to it, and yet others are 
agnostic but willing to accommodate certain aspects of it. But “not 
a single constitution abstains from, overlooks, or remains other-
wise silent with respect to religion. With the exception of the con-
crete organizing principles and prerogatives of [a] polity’s govern-
ing institutions, the only substantive domain addressed by all 
modern constitutions is religion.”12 What could be a more telling 
illustration of religion’s omnipresence in today’s world, or a 
stronger testament to constitutionalism’s entanglement with, if 
not existential fear of, religion? 
What is the source of this deep trepidation? An obvious rea-
son is that religion is an all-encompassing belief and behavior-
guiding system that preceded constitutionalism. It still enjoys a 
first-mover advantage. It is also highly resilient. Sustained and 
even violent attempts to eradicate religion have globally failed. 
Another is the massive and continuous popular appeal of religion. 
 
 11 See Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy at 17 (cited in note 7). 
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The numbers speak for themselves: 62 percent of the global pop-
ulation defines itself as religious; it is estimated that 91 percent 
of sub-Saharan Africa’s population, 80 percent of Latin America’s 
population, and 70 percent of the Middle East and North Africa’s 
population identify as religious, with North America (a whopping 
47 percent) and EU Europe (44 percent) as the least religious re-
gions.13 In other words, even in the least religious parts of the 
world, one in two identifies as a believer. The on-the-ground out-
reach of religion is considerably better than that of constitution-
alism. In fact, it would be safe to assume that even today, let alone 
in premodern times, many more people worldwide have been in a 
church, have read the Bible, celebrate religious holidays, or qui-
etly implore God’s help than the number of people who have set 
foot in a constitutional court or can recite full verses from their 
respective countries’ constitutions and bills of rights. Strikingly, 
the two largest democracies in the world, India and the United 
States—both of which adhere to a constitutional separation of 
religion and state—are frequently mentioned as the two most re-
ligious societies in the world, as measured by how significant re-
ligion is in public discourse and in private lives. Succinctly put, 
religion is more popular and widespread than constitutionalism. 
Another main reason for constitutionalism’s anxiety with re-
ligion is that ultimately, contrary to conventional wisdom, the two 
domains have much more in common than meets the eye. Both 
domains are revered symbolic systems that reflect ideals, aspira-
tions, and principles larger than ordinary life. Both domains pre-
sent themselves as autonomous, apolitical, and morality driven. 
Both feature core constitutive texts and rituals, alongside hierar-
chical interpretive structures aimed at translating the core texts 
into guidelines for everyday life. In both domains, a trade-off be-
tween interpretation and amendment is apparent, whereby the 
harder it is to alter the text, the greater the likelihood of interpre-
tive wars over the text’s true meaning. Support for originalist, 
purposive, and living-tree interpretive schools is evident in both 
spheres. As often is the case in other contexts, the most uncom-
promising positions vis-à-vis one another are held by parties with 
 
 13 Religion Data from End of Year Survey 2016 *25 (WIN/Gallup, Apr 10, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/JDK2-WH29. Similar statistics from 2015 are available at Losing 
Our Religion? Two Thirds of People Still Claim to Be Religious (WIN/Gallup, Apr 13, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9CWX-BGLP. 
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closely related interests and affinities, be they divorcées untangling 
property14 or ethnic communities sharing the same territory.15 
The underappreciated resemblance between constitutional-
ism and religion, alongside religion’s well-developed spiritual, 
moral, and institutional authority, and its continuous appeal to 
billions of people worldwide, suggest that religion is one of the few 
symbolic metasystems that offer a holistic, full-board alternative 
to constitutionalism. Even a single facet of a religious belief 
system—religious law—offers a substantive alternative to the 
statist basis of modern constitutionalism. Canon law, Jewish law, 
Sharia law, and Hindu law predate state law and the constitu-
tional domain. The ideas and doctrines developed by these pre-
statist, preconstitutional legal traditions continue to impact a 
wide range of legal areas, from commerce law to family law. 
In contemporary secularized nations, the role formerly 
granted to religion is conspicuously supplanted; a polity’s consti-
tutional framework is often its “supreme law” and, as such, tends 
to infiltrate many facets of public and private life, just as religion 
has been traditionally wont to do.16 In some settings—the United 
States immediately comes to mind—the Constitution may itself 
acquire near-numinous status; much like holy scripture, it is en-
shrined.17 As Aharon Barak, former president of the Supreme 
Court of Israel, once suggested, “Nothing falls beyond the purview 
of judicial review. The world is filled with law; anything and eve-
rything is justiciable.”18 Under such an all-encompassing outlook, 
the law systemically conceives of religion in terms cognizable 
within the legal or constitutional framework.19 It thus “formats,” 
or reconstructs, religion in a way that subjects it to the constitu-
tional order.20 
 
 14 See notes 35–44 and accompanying text. 
 15 See notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 16 Constitutions typically include a supremacy clause, defining them as the “the su-
preme law of the land” (in the United States) or simply the “supreme law” (in Canada). 
See US Const Art VI, cl 2; Canada Constitution Act Part VII, § 52(1) (1982). 
 17 See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 10–14 (Princeton 1988). 
 18 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism 169 (Harvard 2004). 
 19 See, for example, Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the 
Claims of Constitutionalism 24–28 (Toronto 2015). 
 20 See, for example, Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts as Bulwarks of Secularism, 
in Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, and Robert A. Kagan, eds, Consequential 
Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective 311, 312–13 (Cambridge 2013). 
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Although secular constitutionalism enjoys a widespread 
reach and a structural advantage in defining the boundary be-
tween the public and the private, and between the sacred and the 
profane, it still lags behind religion’s omnipresence in people’s 
lives. As Professor Benjamin Berger astutely observes, “The reli-
gious conscience ascribes to life a divine dimension that infuses 
all aspects of being. The authority of the divine extends to all de-
cisions, actions, times, and places in the life of the devout.”21 Pre-
cisely because of its wholeness, ubiquitous nature, and embedded 
authority, religion addresses the human need for “belonging,” 
“meaning,” or “guidance” in a manner that is often more whole-
some and effective (from the perspective of the believer and the 
faith community) than a given polity’s constitutional framework. 
In its abstract fulsomeness, spiritual power, and supraterritorial-
ity, religion is a kingdom without end; sovereign in the eyes of its 
followers, past, present, and future; here, there, and everywhere. 
Religion therefore presents a challenge to the state’s monopolist 
power in the Weberian sense22 or to the “seeing like a state” logic 
formulated by Professor James Scott.23 It further blurs expecta-
tions concerning functional differentiation, moral authority, and 
legal hierarchy, in line with Professor Niklas Luhmann’s social 
systems theory.24 With such an omnipotent and experienced rival 
enterprise—a true “kingdom without end” with the master of the 
universe at its apex, as the biblical prophecy goes25—the constitu-
tional domain must feel threatened and constantly on the watch 
to maintain its symbolic hegemony and legal authority. 
This vying for supremacy is manifested clearly in the ways 
in which courts and judges wrestle with the task of articulating 
the conceptual boundaries of constitutional accommodation of 
religion-based arguments. From Canada to India and Britain to 
 
 21 Benjamin Berger, The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the 
Liberal State, 17 Can J L & Society 39, 47 (Apr 2002). 
 22 Max Weber defined the state as a “human community that (successfully) lays 
claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.” Max 
Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in David Owen and Tracy B. Strong, eds, The Vocation Lec-
tures 32, 33 (Hackett 2004) (Rodney Livingstone, trans). He continues, “If the state is to 
survive, those who are ruled over must always acquiesce in the authority that is claimed 
by the rulers of the day.” Id at 34. 
 23 See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Hu-
man Condition Have Failed 88–95 (Yale 1998). 
 24 See Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems 236–38 (Stanford 1995) (John Bednarz Jr 
and Dirk Baecker, trans) (defining morality in terms of social esteem and noting that such 
a definition “does not presuppose a consensus”). 
 25 Luke 1:32–33; 1 Chronicles 17:11–14 (New American Standard Version). 
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South Africa, the specter of litigants turning to religious or cus-
tomary sources of law as authoritative guides for regulating their 
behavior, alongside or in lieu of other norms, has risen to the fore-
front of public debate and constitutional battle. At stake is not 
merely the question whether a particular individual or group 
may seek exemption from a general rule, but rather which type 
of institution—a public court enforcing democratically enacted 
laws and regulations, or a faith-based tribunal applying religious-
based norms and practices—will have the authority to make a fi-
nal, binding decision. 
That courts in expressly “separationist” state-and-religion re-
gimes (for example, France) take an overall religion-limiting 
stance is not surprising. This trend has been witnessed in recent 
years at the national level as well as the supranational (European) 
context. A classic example of this pattern is S.A.S., in which the 
ECtHR—typically, the apex of individual-rights protections—
ruled that the countervailing societal interest of “living together” 
must prevail.26 Based on this rationale, the ECtHR upheld 
France’s ban against face covering in public spaces.27 
A notably more difficult setting for probing into how courts 
deal with claims of religion is that of countries that pride them-
selves on advancing an official multicultural agenda (for example, 
Canada and South Africa). In these pro-diversity jurisdictions, 
two different categories of constitutional responses to religious-
based claims for recognition may be identified: (1) religious or cul-
tural claims that can reasonably be construed as accepting the 
ultimate authority and supremacy of the constitutional order, 
which may be referred to, for the purposes of simplicity and ana-
lytical clarity, as “diversity as inclusion”; and (2) “claims for insu-
lation, if not outright immunization, from the purview of the 
state’s secular ordering and its centrifugal force, claims that are 
based on adherence to sacred or customary sources of authority 
and identity. This latter pattern [may be labeled] ‘non-state law 
as competition.’”28 
When viewed through this prism, it is evident that as long as 
legal claims for accommodation are not seen as challenging the 
lexical superiority of the constitutional order itself, they stand a 
 
 26 S.A.S., [2014] 3 ECtHR at 381 at ¶ 157. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar, The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diver-
sity, Restricting Competition, 30 Cardozo L Rev 2535, 2536 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 
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fair chance of success. Contrast that with the unyielding reluc-
tance of legislatures and judiciaries to accept as binding or even 
cognizable any potentially competing legal order that originates 
in sacred or customary sources of identity and authority. This pat-
tern of clamping down and refusing to accept any alternative 
sources of regulation or hierarchies of authority becomes particu-
larly visible when the legal challenge at issue is interpreted as 
raising doubts about which set of norms and institutions, or what 
set of high priests, should have the final word in authoritatively 
resolving disputes within a given polity. This is a challenge that 
no constitutional order, no matter how tolerant and otherwise 
open to exemptions and accommodations for religious believers, 
can accept with indifference. 
Granted, the constitutional accommodation of religion may 
be extensive at times. Examples range from the Supreme Court 
of India’s decision in Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala,29 to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Multani v Commission 
Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys;30 and from the US Supreme Court 
rulings in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission31 or Burwell 
v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc,32 to the German Constitutional Court 
judgment in the 2015 Headscarf Case.33 But such accommodation 
seldom, if ever, amounts to replacing the ultimate supremacy of 
the constitutional order with a religious order. When faced with 
more-radical calls for replacing the constitutional authority with 
religion’s authority, “even the most generous and even-handed of-
ficials of the civil religion are structurally not in a position to rule 
from a ‘point of view from nowhere.’”34 Instead, as stakeholders in 
 
 29 [1986] 3 SCR 518, 531–33, 539 (India) (holding that Jehovah’s Witnesses may re-
frain from reciting the Indian national anthem for religious reasons). 
 30 [2006] 1 SCR 256, 297–98 at ¶ 79 (Can) (holding that a Sikh boy may bring a 
kirpan, a dagger-like metal object, to school in accordance with his religious practice). 
 31 565 US 171, 188–89 (2012) (holding that an instructor of religion at a Lutheran 
school fell under the “ministerial exemption,” requiring the dismissal of her employment 
discrimination suit). 
 32 134 S Ct 2751, 2774–75, 2785 (2014) (holding that closely held private corporations 
may be exempt from regulations to which their owners object on religious grounds). 
 33 138 BVerfG 296, 342–43 at ¶¶ 115–16 (2015) (holding that Muslim educators in 
interdenominational state schools may wear headscarves). 
 34 Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar, The Constitutional Boundaries of Religious Ac-
commodation, in Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld, eds, Constitutional Secularism 
in an Age of Religious Revival 175, 176 (Oxford 2014). 
This is a narrower claim than stating that any type of engagement between law 
and religion is inevitably “tainted” by the cultural dominance of liberalism and 
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and enforcers of the state’s rule of law, they may feel obligated to 
reaffirm the superiority of its sources of legitimacy, procedures of 
engagement, methods of interpretation, and styles of reasoning 
that are state driven and entrenched in the secular constitution 
precisely when the very foundations of the legal and social order 
they protect and adhere to are (or are perceived to be) at stake. 
An illustration of the renewed emphasis on the state’s au-
thority to enforce general constitutional provisions against ex-
pressions of pious resistance to the constitutional ground rules is 
found in the landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision of 
Bruker v Marcovitz;35 here, the court rejected the claim that when 
religious freedom is the basis for noncompliance with a contrac-
tual obligation, such noncompliance is immunized from judicial 
review or intervention.36 In the Bruker case, a Jewish husband 
made a contractual commitment to remove barriers to religious 
remarriage in a negotiated settlement reached with the consent 
of the parties and after consultation with independent legal coun-
sel.37 That agreement was incorporated as a binding condition for 
the final divorce decree between the parties (decree nisi); indeed, 
its provisions became part of the terms that enabled the civil di-
vorce to be finalized by the relevant state authority.38 Once the 
husband had obtained the secular divorce, however, he failed to 
honor the agreement, claiming that he had undertaken a moral ra-
ther than a legal obligation.39 Mr. Marcovitz claimed that his faith 
commitments are nonjusticiable before a general court of law.40 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a majority opinion penned 
by Justice Rosalie Abella, rejected this claim. It held, instead, 
that it was fully within the court’s jurisdiction to “[r]ecogniz[e] 
the enforceability by civil courts of agreements to discourage 
religious barriers to remarriage, address[ ] the gender discrimi-
nation those barriers may represent and alleviate[ ] the effects 
 
secularism, given that, in many parts of the world, religion has a strong claim 
for governance and might be officially recognized by the state. 
Id at 176 n 2, citing generally Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (cited in note 7). 
 35 [2007] 3 SCR 607 (Can). 
 36 See id at 630–31 at ¶ 47. 
 37 Id at 623 at ¶ 23. 
 38 Canada’s Divorce Act requires parties to remove religious barriers to remarriage. 
See Divorce Act § 21.1(2), RSC 1985 ch 3 (2d Supp) (Can). 
 39 See Bruker, [2007] 3 SCR at 620 at ¶ 11. 
 40 See id. 
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they may have on extracting unfair concessions in a civil di-
vorce.”41 The court dismissed the nonjusticiability claim and 
stated unequivocally that the ultimate authority to determine the 
delicate balance of accommodation is in its exclusive hands.42 The 
final decision, it stated, is not reserved for those seeking exemp-
tion or immunity from general laws by raising the claim that re-
ligion is nonjusticiable.43 Instead, the state’s high constitutional 
priests retain the crucial designation as the ultimate arbiters in 
conflicts between the constitutional sphere and its competitors.44 
This is a textbook example of how the clash of orders is contained 
as a threshold structural matter. Once a faith-based claim is 
brought before a court of law, it not only gets translated to the 
language of legalese, but the constitution also gains an upper 
hand over religion in the struggle over determining who, or which 
entity, defines the boundaries between the spheres, or the lexical 
priority of state and altar. Once the constitution is defined as the 
supreme law of the land (as it is in Canada), it has the authority 
to clarify the confines and validity of claims for noncompliance 
made in religion’s name in cases of direct confrontation or compe-
tition between them. 
In countries that do not adhere to the strict separation model 
but instead grant religious or customary communities some de-
gree of jurisdictional autonomy (for example, in the realms of fam-
ily law, conversion, denominational education, or inheritance), 
struggles over supremacy between general courts and religious 
tribunals are even more pronounced. In such circumstances, 
when the “two kingdoms” are not metaphysical but rather find 
institutional manifestation as competing jurisdictional systems 
operating within the same space, clashes over the scope of author-
ity and the “chain of command” between constitutional courts and 
religious tribunals seem inevitable. 
Such tensions have become pronounced in the Israeli legal 
system. In a landmark ruling, Bavli v The Grand Rabbinical 
Court,45 the Supreme Court of Israel considerably expanded its 
 
 41 Id at 608 (emphasis added). 
 42 See id at 630–31 at ¶ 47. 
 43 Bruker, [2007] 3 SCR at 615–16 at ¶ 2, 620–23 at ¶¶ 13–20. 
 44 Drawing on a similar logic (and citing Bruker), the UK Supreme Court determined 
in its recent watershed decision in Shergill v Khaira, [2015] 1 AC 359, 378–79 at ¶¶ 44–
45 (UKSC 2015), that religious disputes are justiciable before the secular courts. The case 
involved an internal dispute concerning succession procedures and control of religious 
trust moneys in a Sikh congregation. 
 45 HC 1000/92, 48(2) PD 6 (Isr 1995). 
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overarching review of religious tribunals’ jurisprudence by hold-
ing that all religious tribunals, including the Grand Rabbinical 
Court, are statutory bodies established by law and funded by the 
state; in principle, all aspects of their judgments are thus subject 
to review by the supreme court.46 Although the court recognized 
the special jurisdictional mandate awarded to Jewish, Muslim, 
Christian, and Druze courts by the legislature, it nevertheless as-
serted its power to impose constitutional norms on their exercise 
of authority. 
Concern with defining who, or which entity, holds the ulti-
mate authority in a system that officially recognizes competing 
normative and legal orders has also manifested itself in the South 
African Constitutional Court’s landmark decisions dealing with 
customary law—a main feature of South Africa’s legal pluralism 
model. In Bhe v Khayelitsha,47 Gumede v President of the Republic 
of South Africa,48 and Shilubana v Nwamitwa,49 the court sub-
jected customary law and tribunals to the general equality provi-
sions of the constitution. The court stated that customary law is 
at the same time “protected by and subject to the Constitution.”50 
It is a living legal tradition that will “inevitably be interpreted, 
applied and, when necessary, amended or developed by the com-
munity itself or by the courts. This will be done in view of exist-
ing customs and traditions . . . and of course the demands of the 
Constitution as the supreme law.”51 
In AI v MT52—the first case in English legal history in which 
an English High Court referred the resolution of a contested 
Jewish divorce to nonbinding religious arbitration—the overarch-
ing monitoring authority of the general court system was pre-
served.53 Here, a UK court permitted the parties, upon their re-
quest, to turn to the Jewish Beth Din in New York to deal with 
personal-status and family-law issues, including child custody ar-
rangements, under the clear stipulation that the UK civil court 
 
 46 See id. For information on Sharia court jurisdiction, see Plonit v Ploni, CA 3077/90, 
49(2) PD 578 (Isr 1995). For further discussion, see Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy at 
143–44 (cited in note 7). 
 47 [2005] 1 S Afr 580, 606 at ¶ 44 (CC). 
 48 [2009] 3 S Afr 152, 167–68 at ¶¶ 33–36 (CC). 
 49 [2009] 2 S Afr 66, 80 at ¶¶ 42–43 (CC). 
 50 Bhe, [2005] 1 S Afr at 604–05 at ¶ 41. 
 51 Shilubana, [2009] 2 SA at 90 at ¶ 81 (emphasis added). 
 52 [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam). 
 53 See id at ¶ 37. 
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would retain the authority to accept or reject the Beth Din’s rul-
ing, thus allowing for greater diversity but also preserving the 
authority and juridical superiority of the civil court system. 
It remains an open question, however, whether courts in 
deeply diverse societies can, over time and under changed politi-
cal circumstances, continue to tame religious-based conflicts and 
intercommunal tensions. The oft-cited Shah Bano saga in India is 
a good illustration. Shah Bano, an elderly Muslim woman, was 
divorced by her husband of forty-three years through the Muslim 
practice of talaq, which allows a husband to invoke a unilateral, 
immediate divorce. In its famous ruling in Mohammed Ahmad 
Khan v Shah Bano Begum54 (“Shah Bano”), the Supreme Court of 
India held that a neglected wife’s state-defined statutory right to 
maintenance should stand regardless of the personal law (in this 
case Islamic Sharia law) applicable to the parties.55 Traditionalist 
representatives of India’s large Muslim community considered 
this decision, which sided with the woman and validated the sec-
ular mandate over a religious-based counterclaim, proof that 
homogenizing trends toward Hinduism threatened to weaken 
Muslim minority identity. India’s Parliament, then led by Rajiv 
Gandhi’s Congress Party, eventually bowed to massive political 
pressure by conservative Muslims and overruled the Indian 
Supreme Court’s decision in Shah Bano by passing the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights of Divorce) Act.56 Despite its reas-
suring title, this new bill undid the court’s ruling by eliminating 
Muslim women’s recourse to state courts in appealing for post-
divorce maintenance payments. It also exempted Muslim ex-
husbands from other postdivorce obligations.57 So harsh was the 
Muslim dissenting reaction to Shah Bano that it is named by no-
table commentators among the catalysts for the subsequent as-
cent of right-wing Hindu politicians who accused the then-ruling 
Congress Party of compromising constitutional principles in order 
to appease Islamic fundamentalists and appeal to Muslim votes.58 
A new iteration of the constitutional battle over Muslim di-
vorce law was recently deliberated before the Supreme Court of 
 
 54 [1985] 3 SCR 844 (India). 
 55 Id at 846–47 at ¶ 2.3. 
 56 Act No 25 of 1986 (India). 
 57 See, for example, Danial Latifi v Union of India, [2001] 7 SCC 740, 751–52 (India). 
 58 See S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing 
Limits 192 (Oxford 2002); Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Wheel of Law: India’s Secularism 
in Comparative Constitutional Context 106 (Princeton 2003). 
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India—Shayara Bano v Union of India.59 Following the court’s 
landmark ruling (3–2) in August 2017 that declared the talaq 
instant-divorce law unconstitutional on gender equality 
grounds, Muslim leaders and legal activists have pointed to the 
split-decision factor and suggested that practices like the triple 
talaq ought to be reviewed by the community itself.60 It remains 
to be seen how matters will unfold, in particular in light of the 
current Hindu-nationalist undertone of Indian politics under the 
reign of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata 
Party–led (BJP) government. 
II.  WHO BELONGS? THE AFFINITY BETWEEN RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION AND REVIVALIST NATIONALISM 
After emerging as a “default design choice,” liberal constitu-
tionalism is under siege in many parts of the world.61 One of the 
main characteristics of the current populist, or illiberal, trend in 
world politics is the increasing reliance on religious rhetoric and 
the heightened demarcation of “us against them.” Religion-based 
boundaries (real or imagined) are reintroduced into politics or 
strategically deployed to advance exclusionary or nativist plat-
forms. Much has been written about President Donald Trump’s 
persistent recourse to playing the anti-Muslim card, his portrayal 
of the United States as a Christian nation under siege, his re-
peated association of Islam with evil, and his countless innu-
endoes to Christian scripture and prophecy.62 Indian Prime 
Minister Modi has referred to Hinduism and Hindu nationalism 
(what is commonly known as Hindutva—the official ideology of the 
BJP since 1989) to galvanize support for his party.63 In Russia, ob-
servers note, the relations between the Kremlin under President 
 
 59 Shayara Bano v Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No 118 of 2016, slip op at 267–
72 at ¶¶ 198–200 (India Aug 22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/EQS7-PYF7 (striking 
down the practice of talaq-el-biddat, or instant unilateral divorce, for being arbitrary and 
discriminatory). 
 60 See Suchitra Mohanty and Rupam Jain, Muslim Divorce Law ‘Unconstitutional,’ 
Rules India’s Top Court (Reuters, Aug 22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5LRD-XNTU. 
 61 Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal 
Constitutionalism, 85 U Chi L Rev 239, 239 (2018). 
 62 See, for example, Michelle Goldberg, Donald Trump, the Religious Right’s Trojan 
Horse (NY Times, Jan 27, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/ 
opinion/sunday/donald-trump-the-religious-rights-trojan-horse.html (visited Dec 15, 
2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Emma Green, Donald Trump Declares a Vision of Re-
ligious Nationalism (The Atlantic, Feb 2, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/RD4R-7E5L. 
 63 The official BJP platform begins with these words: 
2018] The Challenge of Religion to Modern Constitutionalism 441 
 
Vladimir Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church have not been 
this close in over a century. The Russian parliament adopted a 
series of laws that set out to protect majoritarian “religious feel-
ings” and “traditional values,” thereby explicitly targeting core ten-
ets of liberal constitutionalism.64 Meanwhile, in Turkey, President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) have been advancing an illiberal constitutional agenda 
that, among other things, brings back faith-based values into the 
national collective-identity discourse after over eighty years of 
militant secularism guided by the Kemalist vision.65 In virtually 
all of these settings, the wave of religion-infused political rheto-
ric has translated into the quest for greater political control of apex 
courts’ composition and the accompanying appointment of con-
servative judges that are sympathetic to the religio-nationalist 
line; nationalist legislation on matters like sovereignty, citizen-
ship, and immigration; and rapidly diminishing respect for plu-
ralism, minority rights, and civil liberties. These tendencies are 
often complemented, if not fueled, by an “us first” attitude and 
steadfast positions against global constitutionalist values viewed 
as an elitist, liberal project. 
The alliance between religious-infused markers of identity 
and the current populist assault on constitutional democracy 
is also evident in less commonly traversed settings. In Poland, 
President Andrzej Duda and the right-wing national conserva-
tive Law and Justice Party (PiS) rediscovered religion as a 
voter magnet in that country, and now PiS stresses the close 
 
In the history of the world, the Hindu awakening of the late twentieth century 
will go down as one of the most monumental events in the history of the world. 
Never before has such demand for change come from so many people. Never be-
fore has Bharat, the ancient word for the motherland of Hindus—India, been 
confronted with such an impulse for change. This movement, Hindutva, is 
changing the very foundations of Bharat and Hindu society the world over. 
Hindutva: The Great Nationalist Ideology (BJP), archived at http://perma.cc/YM99-UFNA. 
 64 See Mikhail Antonov, Religion, Sexual Minorities and the Rule of Law in Russia: 
Mutual Challenges *11–13 (St. Petersburg National Research University, Higher School 
of Economics Research Paper WP BRP 45/PS/2017, Mar 9, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/426D-TRMR; Alicja Curanović, The Guardians of Traditional Values: 
Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status *5–7 (Transatlantic 
Academy Paper Series, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D928-LTHU. 
 65 See Elliot Ackerman, Atatürk versus Erdoğan: Turkey’s Long Struggle (New 
Yorker, July 16, 2016), online at http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/ataturk 
-versus-erdogan-turkeys-long-struggle (visited Oct 4, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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ties between Roman Catholicism and Polish national iden-
tity.66 As in other places, women’s rights were among the first cas-
ualties. One of the new government’s initial actions was to sup-
port a proposed citizens’ bill, known as the “Stop Abortion” 
legislation, which would have tightened an already-restrictive 
law, making abortion punishable with a five-year prison term. 
Widespread protests and rallies around the country, most of them 
organized and led by women, have eventually led to a withdrawal 
of the government’s support for the proposed bill, but not from its 
broader agenda. The European Commission recently took the ex-
traordinary step of issuing a rule-of-law recommendation on the 
situation in Poland, in which it recommended that “Polish author-
ities take appropriate action to address th[e] systematic threat to 
the rule of law” created by the actions of the Polish government.67 
This recommendation was issued on account of findings that, 
among other concerns, Poland’s apex court, the Constitutional 
Tribunal, was prevented by the Polish government from carrying 
out its mandate to deliver effective constitutional review.68 
Meanwhile, in Hungary, a direct confrontation between the 
nationalist government—led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—
and the EU regarding centralized migrant-relocation policies has 
been brewing since the 2015 refugee crisis. Religious talk has 
been invoked by Orbán to defy EU policies on the matter. Orbán 
went on record stating: 
Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and rep-
resent a radically different culture. Most of them are not 
Christians, but Muslims . . . . This is an important question, be-
cause Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. 
 
 66 See James Traub, The Party That Wants to Make Poland Great Again (NY Times 
Mag, Nov 2, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/magazine/the-party 
-that-wants-to-make-poland-great-again.html (visited Dec 15, 2017) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 67 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 27.7.2016 regarding the 
Rule of Law in Poland *21 at ¶ 74 (July 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/F7HM 
-64CS. See also Rule of Law: Commission Issues Recommendation to Poland (European 
Commission, July 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3C29-ZMCC. 
 68 See Commission Recommendation of 27.7.2016 regarding the Rule of Law in 
Poland *10–11 at ¶¶ 18–24, 20 at ¶ 72 (cited in note 67). For a further description of the 
Polish government’s attack on the judiciary, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legal-
ism, 85 U Chi L Rev 545, 552–53 (2018). See also David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 
85 U Chi L Rev 521, 534 (2018). 
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 Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is 
now barely able to keep Europe Christian? There is no alter-
native, and we have no option but to defend our borders.69 
In Israel, the right-wing nationalist coalition government led 
by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—and, in particular, the 
coalition party Ha’Bait Ha’Yehudi (“the Jewish Home”)—are 
forcefully advancing the “Israel is a Jewish state” ticket, thereby 
threatening to alter the foundational two-tenet character of Israel 
as a Jewish and democratic state.70 Since 2014, it has promoted 
the adoption of a new Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the 
Jewish People, dubbed the “nation-state bill,” aimed at bolstering 
the country’s Jewish-national character while limiting its demo-
cratic character. The proposed bill would instruct the Supreme 
Court to favor, in case of a conflict, or lacuna, the “Jewish” (how-
ever difficult this term remains to define) over the “democratic” 
character of the state.71 It is also aimed at bolstering the status of 
Jewish law as an interpretive source. The draft law proposes to 
prescribe Jewish law in the absence of legal precedent and to in-
struct courts to interpret laws in the spirit of Israel as the home-
land of the Jewish people.72 These legislative attempts are backed 
by strong political rhetoric. In August 2017, to pick one example, 
the minister of justice (of the Ha’Bait Ha’Yehudi Party) publicly 
declared in reaction to a moderately liberalizing ruling of the 
Supreme Court of Israel in the context of asylum-seeker rights 
that matters of demography and the Jewish majority have be-
come a legal blind spot for the court inasmuch as they carry no 
decisive weight in comparison to questions of individual rights. 
“Zionism should not continue, and I say here, it will not continue,” 
the minister added, “to bow down to the system of individual 
rights interpreted in a universal way that divorces them from the 
 
 69 Ian Traynor, Migration Crisis: Hungary PM Says Europe in Grip of Madness (The 
Guardian, Sept 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9N7-L985. Note that in September 
2017, the ECJ upheld the EU migrant-relocation scheme and dismissed an appeal filed by 
Hungary and Slovakia, reaffirming the European Union’s prerogative to order individual 
member states to take in refugees. See generally Slovakia and Hungary v Council of the 
European Union, Case Nos C-643/15 & C-647/15, slip op (ECJ Sept 6, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/98J5-XG4A. 
 70 See Jonathan Lis, Bill Would Force High Court Rulings to Favor Israel’s Jewish 
Character over Democracy (Haaretz, July 11, 2017), online at http://www.haaretz.com/ 
israel-news/.premium-1.800834 (visited Oct 4 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 71 See id. 
 72 See Jonathan Lis, Israeli Bill Prescribes Jewish Law in Absence of Legal Precedent 
(Haaretz, Sept 17, 2017), online at http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium 
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history of the Knesset and the history of legislation that we all 
know.”73 
In Malaysia, the political sphere has undergone substantial 
Islamization over the last four decades.74 The Islamic dakwah (re-
ligious revival) movement emerged in the mid-1970s.75 The Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, or PAS) has 
been gaining political support and clout since the 1980s.76 In the 
hotly contested 2013 general elections, a coalition of PAS and its 
allies (the Pakatan Rakyat coalition, or PKR) received the major-
ity of the popular vote.77 Nonetheless, as a result of Malaysia’s rather 
peculiar electoral system, the mainstream Barisan Nasional (BN) 
coalition has still managed to secure the majority of seats in the 
parliament.78 The rise of political Islam has affected the main-
stream moderate establishment. Even politicians affiliated with 
the BN must now resort to religious talk in their appeal to the 
Islamic vote.79 The former prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir 
bin Mohamad, speaking as a representative of United Malays 
National Organization  (“the largest political party in Malaysia 
and the pillar of the BN coalition”), “declared in [ ] 2001 that the 
country was an Islamic State (negara Islam), not merely a 
country that had endorsed Islam as its official religion.”80 
 
 73 Revital Hovel, Justice Minister Slams Israel’s Top Court, Says It Disregards 
Zionism and Upholding Jewish Majority (Haaretz, Aug 29, 2017), online at 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.809617 (visited Dec 15, 2017) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 74 See generally Joseph Chinyong Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contempo-
rary Malaysia (Oxford 2009). 
 75 See Ahmad F. Yousif, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: An Islamic Response to 
Non-Muslim Concerns, 21 Am J Islamic Soc Sci 30, 31 (Fall 2004). 
 76 See generally Farish A. Noor, Blood, Sweat and Jihad: The Radicalization of the 
Political Discourse of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) from 1982 Onwards, 25 Con-
temp SE Asia 200 (2003). 
 77 Stéphanie Giry, Malaysian Rivals’ Reunion Highlights Shifting Political Alliances 
(NY Times, Sept 6, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/world/asia/ 
malaysian-rivals-reunion-highlights-shifting-political-alliances.html (visited Dec 15, 
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 78 See Ambiga Sreenevasan, Malaysia’s Many Scandals (NY Times, Aug 20, 2015), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/21/opinion/among-malaysias-many 
-scandals.html (visited Dec 15, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 79 See Anisah Shukry and Jason Koutsoukis, How Najib Plans to Embrace Malaysia’s 
Islamic Heartland (Bloomberg, July 30, 2017), online at http://www 
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by the United Malays National Organization, the leading party in the BN coalition, to 
court Muslim voters). 
 80 Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy at 130 (cited in note 7). The impact on popular 
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The effect of the Islamization of political discourse on 
Malaysia’s constitutional jurisprudence has been profound. To 
provide but one example, a Catholic newspaper in Malaysia used 
the word “Allah” to refer to God in its Malay-language edition.81 
A controversy arose regarding who may use the word “Allah”: 
whether it is an exclusively Muslim word (as some Muslim lead-
ers in Malaysia suggest) or a neutral term referring to One God 
that may be used by all regardless of religion, as the newspaper 
argued.82 In the 1980s, the Malaysian government issued a di-
rective prohibiting Christian publications from using the word 
“Allah,”83 but this prohibition had seldom been enforced prior to 
2007. In 2009, the High Court in Kuala Lumpur ruled that the 
restriction on non-Muslims’ use of the word “Allah” to refer to God 
was unconstitutional as it infringed on freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion, specifically in the context of directives issued 
against Christian newspapers.84 The court went on to state that 
the word “Allah” is the correct word for “God” in various Malay 
translations of the Bible and that it has been used for centuries 
by Christians and Muslims alike in Arabic-speaking countries.85 
This ruling was viewed by radical Islamists as a legitimization of 
insidious attempts to convert Muslims to Christianity. Riots and 
church burning followed. The government appealed the High 
Court ruling (lest we forget, this is the government of a country 
that purports to be a polity of all of its members). In October 2013, 
Malaysia’s Court of Appeal (in a three-judge, all-Muslim bench) 
reinstated the ban on the use of the term “Allah” in reference to 
 
Beauty and the Beast a thirteen-plus age rating for its inclusion of a short homosexual 
scene; it had initially sought the removal of the scene. Gwilym Mumford, Beauty and the 
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Fatwa (BBC, Nov 22, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/HW9R-MDA3. 
 81 Malaysia’s Highest Court Backs a Ban on Allah in Christian Bibles (The Guardian, 
June 23, 2014), online at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/malaysia 
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 82 See id. 
 83 See Negeri v Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur, [2013] 8 CLJ 
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 84 Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Negeri, [2010] 2 CLJ 208, 
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God by non-Muslim publications.86 Supporting the government’s 
position, the court stated that it 
could not find any plausible reason as to why the respondent 
is adamant on using the word “Allah” in its weekly newslet-
ter, particularly in its Malay version. Since “Allah” is never 
an integral part of the faith of the respondent [Catholic 
Church], it is reasonable to conclude that the intended usage 
will cause unnecessary confusion.87 
The newspaper appealed. But in June 2014, the Federal Court of 
Malaysia made the final call on the matter. It drew on technical 
judicial review grounds to uphold (4–3) the ban on the use of 
“Allah” when referring to God by non-Muslims.88 And so, in a mul-
tiethnic polity in which “Islam is the religion of the Federation[,] 
but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any 
part of the Federation,”89 “[e]very person has the right to profess 
and practise his religion and . . . to propagate it,”90 and “every re-
ligious group has the right to manage its own religious affairs,”91 
the word “Allah” in reference to God may be invoked, at least un-
der certain circumstances, only by Muslims. 
Close affinity between religion and the construction of ethno-
nationalism is evident in other Asian countries in which there has 
been preferential constitutional treatment of a particular religion 
or group of religions, but without exclusive establishment of a sin-
gle faith as a “state religion” or a mandatory source of legislation 
(for example, Thailand, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and other predom-
inantly Buddhist countries). Thai state-building selectively 
picked elements of Buddhism, transformed Śāsana (Buddhist 
teaching) to mean “religion” in order “to ensure that the Thai 
state would have religion as the foundation of its national iden-
tity.”92 Buddhism remains a key element of national ideology and 
constitutional identity in contemporary Thailand;93 the support of 
 
 86 See Negeri, [2013] 8 CLJ at 929–30 at ¶¶ 42–43. 
 87 Id at 933 at ¶ 53. 
 88 See Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Negeri, [2014] 6 CLJ 
541, 570–85 at ¶¶ 19–46 (Malaysia). 
 89 Malaysia Const Pt I, Art 3, cl 1. 
 90 Malaysia Const Pt II, Art 11, cl 1. 
 91 Malaysia Const Pt II, Art 11, cl 3. 
 92 See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, et al, Introduction, in Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, 
et al, eds, Politics of Religious Freedom 1, 8 (Chicago 2015). 
 93 See Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: 
A Contextual Analysis 3, 178–79 (Hart 2011). 
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Buddhist monkhood is essential to maintaining the regime’s po-
litical legitimacy. Theravada Buddhism receives significant gov-
ernment support, and the constitution retains the requirement 
that the monarch be Buddhist.94 Tellingly, the 2007 constitution 
is officially marked as signed in year 2550 of the Buddhist Era. 
Section 79 of the constitution specifies that the state shall 
protect Buddhism as the religion observed by most Thais for 
a long period of time and other religions, promote good un-
derstanding and harmony among followers of all religions as 
well as encourage the application of religious principles to 
create virtue and develop the quality of life.95 
While freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, laws pro-
hibit the defamation of or insult to Buddhism and Buddhist 
clergy.96 
Similar processes for religious establishment and co-optation 
have aided nation-building processes in Sri Lanka.97 Article 9 of 
the 1978 constitution states: “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give 
to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the 
duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Śāsana, while 
assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 
14(1)(e).”98 The Constitution of Bhutan (2008) states that Buddhism 
is the “spiritual heritage” of the country, and that the Buddhist 
Drupka Lineage is practically the state religion of Bhutan.99 
Buddhism enjoys a de facto preferential status in other countries in 
the region, most notably Burma and Cambodia, where Theravada 
Buddhism has long been a pillar of collective identity and the 
faith of an overwhelming majority of the population. 
Despite these examples of the marriage between religion and 
nationalism, inflaming the affinity between religion and collec-
tive identity is a dangerous strategy because, even if initially pro-
moted by the political establishment, it may easily get out of 
hand. Consider the constitutional implications of the rise of polit-
ical Islam in Egypt. Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution, to pick 
 
 94 Section 9 reads: “The King is a Buddhist and Upholder of religions.” Thai 
Const Ch II, § 9. 
 95 Thai Const Ch V, Pt 4, § 79. 
 96 See International Religious Freedom Report 2007: Thailand (US Department of 
State), archived at http://perma.cc/HCE5-Y4ZX. 
 97 See Benjamin Schonthal, Buddhism, Politics and the Limits of Law: The Pyrrhic 
Constitutionalism of Sri Lanka 7–11 (Cambridge 2016). 
 98 Sri Lanka Const Ch II, Art 9. 
 99 See Bhutan Const Art III. 
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one example, was amended in 1980 so as to establish principles 
of Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia) as the only primary (rather than 
one possible) source of legislation in Egypt.100 This significant 
change was preceded, however, by state patronage of religion, 
including nationalization of waqf assets and later of al-Azhar 
University, the great institution of higher Islamic learning in 
Cairo, and the imposition of state control over al-Azhar’s curricu-
lum and faculty positions, including the appointment of Shaykh 
al-Azhar (head of al-Azhar University)—a major spiritual leader 
and Sharia interpretive authority.101 Meanwhile, the Egyptian 
Supreme Constitutional Court (whose members are appointed by 
the government) developed an innovative interpretive matrix of 
religious directives—the first of its kind by a nonreligious tribu-
nal—so as to interpret the aforementioned Article 2 in a moderate 
way, all while political powerholders repeatedly outlawed the in-
creasingly popular Muslim Brotherhood movement.102 
As often happens, religion’s appeal cannot be fully tamed by 
government control, constitutional or otherwise. The Egyptian rev-
olution of 2012 followed. The constitution introduced in December 
2012 by then-President Mohamed Morsi (of the Freedom and 
Justice Party founded by the Muslim Brotherhood) not only re-
produced Article 2 (stating that principles of Islamic Sharia are 
the source of legislation), but also introduced Article 219, which 
uses technical terms from the Islamic legal tradition to define 
what is actually meant by “the principles of Islamic Shari’a” as 
stated in Article 2.103 That constitution also guaranteed that al-
Ahzar would be consulted on matters of Islamic law;104 Article 11 
stated that the state is to “safeguard ethics, public morality and 
public order”;105 and Article 44 prohibited the defamation of 
 
 100 See Egypt Const Pt I, Art II (1980). 
 101 See Declan Walsh, Egypt’s President Turns to Religion to Bolster His Authority 
(NY Times, Jan 9, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/world/ 
middleeast/egypt-abdel-fattah-el-sisi-islam.html (visited Dec 15, 2017) (Perma archive un-
available) (referring to al-Azhar as “Egypt’s premier authority on Islam”). 
 102 In 2007, for example, then-President Hosni Mubarak introduced a set of consti-
tutional amendments (approved in a referendum) that imposed a ban on the establish-
ment of religious parties (a blatant anti–Muslim Brotherhood move), and loosened con-
trols over security forces in its “war on terror.” Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, The 2007 
Constitutional Amendments in Egypt, and Their Implications on the Balance of Power, 
22 Arab L Q 397, 410–11 (2008). 
 103 Egypt Const Pt I, Ch 1, Art 2 (2012); Egypt Const Pt V, Ch 2, Art 219 (2012) (de-
fining the ambit of Sharia law to extend to the rules of evidence and jurisprudence, among 
other domains). 
 104 Egypt Const Pt I, Ch 1, Art 4 (2012). 
 105 Egypt Const Pt I, Ch 2, Art 11 (2012). 
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prophets and religious messengers, such that it may be inter-
preted as prohibiting blasphemy.106 This new constitution clearly 
veered to the side of religion at the expense of dissolving the pre-
vious balance of power between state and mosque. In a volatile 
political environment, in which constitution drafting and redraft-
ing become a symbol and instrument of expressing different con-
ceptions of the relation between law and religion, virtually all of 
these pro-religion changes were blatantly eliminated by the 2014 
counterrevolution and its new constitution, which essentially re-
turned Egypt’s constitutional recognition of religion to its pre-2012 
state.107 Egypt’s recent turmoil offers a cautionary tale of the deep 
risks associated with setting fire to the identity-religiosity flame 
in the constitutional context. 
III.  SOLIDARITY BEYOND BORDERS: THE TRANSNATIONAL 
NATURE OF RELIGIOUS SOLIDARITY AND ADVOCACY 
Religion knows no borders, metaphysical or territorial. Its am-
bit of authority and influence is distinctly supranational. Its global 
spread and worldwide leadership (the Holy See is an obvious ex-
ample)—aided by an intricate multinational institutional appa-
ratus of congregations, ministers, and missionaries, and by new in-
formation and communication technology—position religion as a 
powerful force in world politics. In particular, Christianity, Islam, 
and Buddhism have followed patterns of migration and di-
asporic settlement to become truly world religions. The 
Protestant Pentecostal and Evangelical movements have ac-
quired significant influence among the local populations in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia. These processes are perfectly aligned 
with globalization processes and what has been termed “the net-
work society.”108 Taken as a whole, the challenge posed by reli-
gion to the current international order—one that, despite the 
forces of globalization, still manifests many of the hallmarks of 
“Westphalian” constitutionalism, with its constitutive nation-
building and “we the people” narrative—is obvious. The global 
reach of religion—with its crossborder, transnational, solidarity 
 
 106 Egypt Const Pt II, Ch 2, Art 44 (2012). 
 107 See Comparing Egypt’s Constitutions (Carnegie Endowment, Dec 2013), archived 
at http://perma.cc/VKS4-4YJX. 
 108 See Peter van der Veer, Religion after 1750, in J.R. McNeill and Kenneth Pomeranz, 
eds, 7 The Cambridge World History: Production, Destruction and Connection, 1750–Present, 
Part 2: Shared Transformations? 160, 178 (Cambridge 2015). 
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basis—offers a viable alternative to the territory-, nation-, or polity-
based constitutional framework. 
In some respects, the global religion challenge to constitu-
tionalism resembles the challenge posed by global economic con-
glomerates to state regulatory powers. Interests and resources 
may be managed on a global scale that evades the grip of any sin-
gle state-based constitutional order. In other important respects, 
the challenge of religion is mightier, as few corporate leaders 
(let alone constitutional thinkers) enjoy the visibility, clout, 
and popular following of a Catholic Pope, Shia Grand Ayatollah, 
Mahayana Buddhist leaders, or even various star televangelists. 
The influence of such religious leaders in support of a certain 
cause or policy is likely to far outweigh the words or actions of any 
other nonreligious leaders or stakeholders. 
An important aspect of religion’s transnational nature and 
alternative basis for solidarity is its tremendous mobilization ca-
pacity. The effect on religious litigation has been considerable. 
Christian and other faith-based civil society organizations in the 
United States have developed a “protecting religious liberty” 
agenda with legal aid, litigation-oriented strategies, case-based 
grassroots activism, cause lawyering, and amicus briefs directed 
to advancing religious interests in various countries across the 
globe.109 In recent years, the American experience alongside the 
more general take-home message of Professor Charles Epp’s “sup-
port structure for legal mobilization” thesis have reached world 
religions.110 Increasingly, international religious groups have ap-
propriated rights discourse and have harnessed its power to ad-
vance their causes in a way characterized as “framejacking.”111 
The zeitgeist of this phenomenon is captured by the words of a 
former director of the Center for Law and Religious Freedom 
(CLRF): 
If my wife had a brain tumor and I said all we are doing is 
praying because my God is a mighty God and he can save and 
heal and he can take care of that tumor, you would say to us, 
 
 109 The Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam) and the Christian Legal Society 
are merely two examples. For descriptions of these two organizations, see About C-Fam 
(C-Fam), archived at http://perma.cc/F8HG-WGPH; About Us (Christian Legal Society), 
archived at http://perma.cc/H6TK-FYNR. 
 110 Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in 
Comparative Perspective 3 (Chicago 1998). 
 111 See, for example, Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World 
Politics 29–30 (Cambridge 2012); Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and Theories of 
Transnational Advocacy, 48 Intl Spectator 71, 82 (Dec 2013). 
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“We admire your faith, but go to the doctor.” So when it comes 
to religious liberty this idea of just praying without going to 
a lawyer is inadequate, superficial, and unbiblical.112 
In the developing world, internationally funded religious-
freedom litigation focuses on the rights of religious minorities (no-
tably Christian communities in non-Christian settings like 
China, India, Vietnam, or Egypt), or fuels litigation-oriented cam-
paigns against expansion of reproductive freedoms (for example, 
in Latin America or the Philippines) or against protection of 
LGBTQ rights (for example, in Africa). Recent studies reveal how 
American evangelists, once isolated in Africa for pro-apartheid 
politics, have successfully reinvented themselves as promoters of 
antigay policies in that continent. Through their extensive com-
munications networks in Africa, social welfare projects, Bible 
schools, and educational materials, US religious conservatives re-
peatedly warn of the dangers of homosexuals and homosexual 
conduct.113 (The Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act drew interna-
tional attention in 2014; same-sex relations remain illegal in most 
African countries.)114 
International litigation-oriented religious mobilization is also 
evident in the European context, in which the ECtHR and (to a 
lesser degree) the ECJ have been the main centers of transna-
tional religious activism, evident in the areas of reproductive free-
doms, the right to die, denominational education, the wearing (or 
banning) of religious attire, and exhibition of religious symbols in 
various settings.115 Religious grassroots international networks 
have been heavily involved (through fundraising, media aware-
 
 112 Kevin R. den Dulk, In Legal Culture, but Not of It: The Role of Cause Lawyers in 
Evangelical Legal Mobilization, in Austin Sarat and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds, Cause 
Lawyers and Social Movements 197, 210–11 (Stanford 2006) (quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Samuel Ericsson, formerly with CLRF). 
 113 See generally Kapya Kaoma, Globalizing the Culture Wars: U.S. Conservatives, 
African Churches, & Homophobia (Political Research Associates 2009); Kapya Kaoma, 
American Culture Warriors in Africa: A Guide to the Exporters of Homophobia and Sexism 
(Political Research Associates 2014). 
 114 See Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Proxy Wars, 13 Stan J CR & CL 53, 53–54 
(2017); Aengus Carroll and Lucas Ramón Mendos, State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World 
Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition *148–49 
(ILGA 12th ed, May 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/J93J-GPXT. 
 115 See Christopher McCrudden, Transnational Culture Wars, 13 Intl J Const L 434, 
442–43, 449–52 (2015); Effie Fokas, Comparative Susceptibility and Differential Effects on 
the Two European Courts: A Study of Grasstops Mobilizations around Religion, 5 Oxford 
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ness campaigns, and intervenor briefs) in virtually all recent ma-
jor decisions on freedom of religion by the ECtHR and by the ECJ, 
most notably in Eweida v United Kingdom116 and Fernández 
Martínez v Spain,117 and most recently in the ECJ ruling in 
Achbita.118 The ECJ ruling prompted outcry from various reli-
gious groups, citing assault on religious freedom, with effects on 
“Muslim women being discriminated in the workplace, but also 
Jewish men who wear kippas, Sikh men who wear turbans, peo-
ple who wear crosses.”119 “The Conference of European Rabbis, 
which comprises seven hundred Jewish leaders across Europe,” 
suggested that “Europe was sending a clear message that its faith 
communities were no longer welcome.”120 
Lautsi v Italy121 (“Lautsi II”)—one of the most significant 
ECtHR judgments on religious matters to date—offers a textbook 
example. The case involved the human-rights claim of a Finnish-
born mother residing in Italy who objected to the display of reli-
gious symbols (crucifixes) in her sons’ public school. From a fairly 
straightforward freedom-from-religion complaint, the case rap-
idly evolved into an existential contemplation of the place of reli-
gious symbols in a given polity’s national identity and the role of 
the court in mediating tensions between national preferences and 
the emerging pan-European rights regime. In the process, it 
brought together strange bedfellows like American Conservative 
Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Vatican, all 
united by their advocacy of Christian symbols in the European 
public sphere.122 
 
 116 [2013] 1 ECtHR 215, 218–19 (holding that Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights was violated when a British Airways flight attendant was prohibited 
from wearing a visible cross at work). 
 117 [2014] 2 ECtHR 449, 454 (holding that a religious organization’s claim to religious 
autonomy was sufficient to trump the claimant’s right to respect for his private life). 
 118 Achbita, [2017] 3 CMLR at 707–09 at ¶¶ 32–44 (holding that, under certain con-
ditions, employers may dismiss employees who refuse to comply with company policies 
concerning religious attire). 
 119 Jennifer Rankin and Philip Oltermann, Europe’s Right Hails EU Court’s Work-
place Headscarf Ban Ruling (The Guardian, Mar 14, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DAL7-8PSJ. 
 120 Id. 
 121 [2011] 3 ECtHR 61 (Grand Chamber). 
 122 See Pasquale Annicchino, Winning the Battle by Losing the War: The Lautsi 
Case and the Holy Alliance between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the Vatican to Reshape European Identity, 6 Religion & Hum Rts 
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An earlier decision of the ECtHR’s seven-judge Chamber, 
Lautsi v Italy123 (“Lautsi I”), held that the mandatory display of 
the crucifix in Italian public school classrooms breached Italy’s 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.124 
The potential impact on countless public schools throughout 
Europe was immense. Even for passive supporters of Europe’s 
Christian identity, Lautsi I—construed as judicial secularization 
of the European public sphere—was perceived as an encroach-
ment on religion and religious freedom. In preparation for 
Lautsi II, an international coalition was formed, led by the 
Catholic Church and its own network of NGOs and following 
states, to “rescue” Italy’s (and Europe’s) Christian heritage.125 Ten 
European countries (the Russian Federation, Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Monaco, Romania, San Marino, and 
Lithuania) intervened as third parties to argue that religious 
symbols have gained core national identity status and thus are 
inseparable from school settings and curricula.126 That coalition 
built on the arguments advanced by the Italian government to 
frame the crucifix in the classroom as a symbol of national cul-
ture, not of religion.127 In Lautsi II, the ECtHR’s seventeen-
member Grand Chamber overturned (15–2) the Chamber’s ruling 
in Lautsi I.128 Rather than requiring state schools to observe con-
fessional neutrality, Lautsi II upheld Italy’s right to display the 
crucifix, an identity-laden symbol of the country’s majority com-
munity, in the classrooms of public schools.129 The crucifix was 
taken to be so central to Italian collective identity that it was up 
to Italians themselves to decide on its status.130 Using the margin-
of-appreciation concept, Europe’s highest human-rights court 
held that it is up to each signatory state to determine whether to 
perpetuate this (majoritarian) tradition.131 In this case, with the 
active support of an extensive transnational network of churches 
and a record number of amicus briefs filed (the majority of them 
favoring the display of the crucifix in the classroom), the margin 
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of appreciation gave preference to Italy’s Christian identity as ex-
pressed in its national constitutional self-perception. 
This unprecedented third-party pro-religious intervener activ-
ism at the supranational level affirms the newly found power of 
transnational religious organizations and their “cause-lawyering” 
strategy. Non-Christian religious minorities have also become in-
creasingly active in religious-freedom litigation in different 
parts of the globe. The diasporic Sikh community, for example, 
has deployed NGOs, such as United Sikhs and the World Sikh 
Organization, to represent litigants or to intervene in landmark 
religious-freedom proceedings from Canada to Italy to the UN 
Human Rights Committee.132 
Such activism on behalf of religious causes at the transitional 
level is not limited to domestic and supranational tribunals. It is 
also visible in the role played by international religious experts in 
constitution drafting in the former Soviet bloc countries and in 
countries as diverse as Nepal, Thailand, or Iraq. Another dimen-
sion of the transnational reach of religion is found in the provision 
of expert advice before various legislative committees in countries 
where coreligionists reside, and participation in interfaith advo-
cacy efforts to promote religious freedom through specialized re-
gional and international bodies. Here, again, the transnational 
and boundless characteristics of religion, along with the growing 
influence of diasporic communities, permit effective mobilization 
across borders. This multiscalar quality of religion presents a 
structural advantage vis-à-vis the territorially bounded constitu-
tional state in the early twenty-first century. 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast with the once-influential secularization theory 
that predicted the decline of religion as a meaningful social and 
political force in the public sphere as a result of processes inher-
ent in modernization, religion is experiencing a resurgence world-
wide as a major spiritual, cultural, and political force. Considering 
the current global convergence on constitutionalism and the fun-
damental ideational differences between liberal constitutional-
rights discourse and most forms of religious doctrine, a “clash of 
values” has erupted in many parts of the world. However, the 
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challenge of religion to modern constitutionalism extends well be-
yond their ideational disagreements. 
In this Essay, we have sought to emphasize the complemen-
tary “clash of orders” dimension, which often goes unnoticed, 
highlighting several structural features that help explain the re-
turn of religion as a powerful challenger to constitutionalism’s su-
preme or higher law standing. First, we focused on the question 
of sovereignty and supremacy. Given the holistic nature of reli-
gious belief systems, with their different sources of authority, sep-
arate constitutive narratives, and ordained high priests, religion 
offers a credible threat to the liberal constitutional narrative and 
to its exclusive position at the apex of the legal order. 
Second, we highlighted the manifold national contexts in 
which religious-based affiliation is utilized, if not outright ma-
nipulated, to construct stark “us versus them” collective-identity 
narratives. In the same vein, religious pretexts are deployed to 
promote conservative value-laden policies, such as preventing 
abortion, limiting nontraditional gender roles and sexual identi-
ties, or restricting freedom of expression to protect the holy scrip-
ture, thus countering much of the agenda that has become asso-
ciated with individual-rights-centered liberal constitutionalism. 
Third, we showed the structural advantage that the transna-
tional nature of religion provides to its adherents. Religious affil-
iation often defies statist, territory-based boundaries. It provides 
a transnational basis for affiliation and solidarity, which, aided 
by global migration patterns, new means of communication, and 
strategic legal mobilization and litigation, poses an increasingly 
serious challenge to the conventional constitutional order. In 
these important respects, the challenge of religion is akin to that 
posed by global economic forces that undercut state authority and 
undermine its self-governance constitutive narratives. 
